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Recently, Maitra et al (Phys. Rev. A, 2017) proposed a protocol towards Device Independent
Quantum Private Query (DI-QPQ) by exploiting a tilted version of local CHSH game on top of the
QPQ protocol proposed by Yang et al (Quant. Inf. Process., 2014). In the present draft, we carefully
tweak the existing protocols to propose a novel QPQ scheme. Our technique exploits the traditional
CHSH game and hence this improved protocol guarantees device independence. Further, we provide
formal security proofs and obtain an upper bound in information leakage to both dishonest client
as well as dishonest server.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the very first proposal due to Chor et al [1],
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) attracts extensive
attention in the domain of classical cryptography [2–6].
The basic idea of PIR is to store N -bits of information
(x1, . . . , xN ) in a database X. Whenever a client wants
to know some bits (i1, . . . , il) of information from the
database, the entire database may be provided so that
the client can extract the information according to the
need. Naturally, in this trivial protocol, the database
cannot learn anything about the query. However, the in-
efficiency lies in communicating the complete database.
Another variant of PIR is Symmetric Private Informa-
tion Retrieval (SPIR) introduced by Gertner et al [7].
SPIR is more stringent than PIR as it takes into ac-
count the security of the database too. In SPIR the
entire database is not provided; only the required ele-
ments queried by the client are supplied in such a manner
so that the database owner cannot get any information
about the queried elements. Designing a secure SPIR
scheme is a difficult task. Since the client’s privacy and
the database security appear to be conflicting, it is elusive
to design information theoretically secure SPIR scheme
both in classical and in quantum domain [7, 8]. However,
under the assumptions that there exist some distributed
databases and those are allowed to share certain random-
ness, designing a secure SPIR scheme might be possible.
Private query is a more practical version of an SPIR
scheme, where the client is allowed to gain more infor-
mation about the database than SPIR. This primitive is
weaker than SPIR but stronger than PIR. However, this
type of primitive suffers from the same limitation as the
PIR schemes. For example, in order to response client’s
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query, server must process the entire database. Other-
wise, the server will gain additional information regard-
ing the indices corresponding to the client’s query. More-
over, the server needs to send the encrypted version of
the entire database; otherwise it would get an estimate
about the number of records that match the query.
All these information retrieval protocols exploit some
mathematical hardness assumptions [2, 9]. Unfortu-
nately, in quantum domain those hardness assumptions
are proved to be tractable [10]. This generates the need
for designing private information retrieval protocols in
quantum domain. In Quantum Private Query (QPQ), a
client issues queries to a database and obtains the value of
data bits corresponding to some particular indices with-
out knowing anything else about the database, whereas
the server should not gain any information about the
query indices of the client. The first protocol in this
domain had been proposed by Giovannetti et al [11], fol-
lowed by [12] and [13]. However, all these protocols used
quantum memories and none of these are practically im-
plementable at this point of time. For implementation
purpose, Jakobi et al [14] presented an idea which was
based on a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) proto-
col [15]. This is the first QPQ protocol based on a QKD
scheme. In 2012, Gao et al [16] proposed a flexible gener-
alization of [14]. Later, Rao et al [17] suggested two more
efficient modifications of classical post-processing in the
protocol of Jakobi et al.
In 2013, Zhang et al [18] proposed a QPQ protocol
based on counter factual QKD scheme [19]. Then, in
2014, Yang et al came up with a flexible QPQ proto-
col [20] which was based on B92 QKD scheme [21]. This
domain is still developing, as evident from number of re-
cent publications [22–24]. Some of these protocols exploit
entangled states to generate the keys between the server
(Bob) and the client (Alice). In some other protocols, a
single qubit is sent to client. The qubit is prepared in cer-
tain states based on the value of the key and the client has
to perform certain measurements on this encoded qubit
to extract the key bit. Although these protocols differ in
the process of key generation, the basic ideas are same.
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2The security of all these protocols is defined on the basis
of the following facts.
• Server (Bob) knows the whole key which would be
used for the encryption of the database.
• Client (Alice) knows a fraction of bits of the key.
• Bob does not get any information about the posi-
tion of the bits which are known to Alice.
It is natural to consider that one of the legitimate parties
may play the role of an adversary. Alice tries to extract
more information about the raw key bits, whereas Bob
tries to know the position of the bits known to Alice.
Thus, such protocols can be viewed as two party mis-
trustful cryptographic primitive.
Very recently, Maitra et al. [25] identified that the se-
curity of all the existing protocols are based on the fact
that Bob relies his devices, i.e., the source which supplies
the qubits and the detectors which measure the qubits.
Thus, similar to the QKD protocols, trustworthiness of
the devices are implicit in the security proofs of the pro-
tocols. With the aim to remove this trustful assumption
over the devices, a device independent protocol has been
described in [25]. The authors introduced a testing phase
for the involved devices and propose a device independent
version over the Yang et al [20] protocol.
A. Revisiting the existing QPQ protocols
The prime objective of any QPQ protocol is to share
a key between the server and the client such that the
server knows every bit of the shared key and the client
knows some of the bits. To share this secret key, most
of the recent QPQ protocols use either BB84 type QKD
scheme or entanglement based QKD scheme (which are
equivalent in certain setting). After the generation of the
shared key, the server encrypts the whole database with
this shared key using one time pad and sends this en-
crypted database to the client. As the client knows some
bits of the key, she can decrypt some of the database bits
corresponding to her conclusively known key bits. The
step by step approaches followed by the existing QPQ
protocols are described here.
1. The server (Bob) and the client (Alice) share a
raw secret key between themselves which is usually
much larger than the size of the database (gener-
ally k times of the database size for some k > 1).
Most of the QPQ protocols use some variants of the
existing QKD schemes [15, 21, 26, 27] to generate
the shared secret key between the server and the
client.
2. The server (Bob) and the client (Alice) then per-
form post processing on the shared key. Both
the parties divide their corresponding raw key into
some substrings of equal length such that the to-
tal number of substrings are equal to the number
of bits in the database and then perform bitwise
XOR among the bits of each substring to generate
each bit of the final key.
3. According to the requirement, the client (Alice) in-
troduces a shift in the key bits and sends the cor-
responding information to the server (Bob).
4. Server (Bob) encrypts the whole database with the
shifted key of considering one-time pad and sends
the encrypted database to client (Alice).
5. Client (Alice) decrypts the encrypted database
with the final shifted key at her place. As client
knows some of the bits of the final key conclusively,
she can recover some of her intended bits from the
database.
Most of the existing protocols rely on the functionality of
the devices. Lack of knowledge about the devices might
cause security loop-hole. Such an attack has been dis-
cussed in [25] and hence a device independent version of
QPQ protocol has been proposed. However, the protocol
is not optimal in terms of sample size (for finite sample
scenario) [28].
B. Relation between QPQ and Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a well studied crypto-
graphic primitive which was first introduced informally
by Wiesner [29] and then subsequently formalized as 1
out of 2 OT in [30]. In 1 out of N OT protocol, the server
Bob knows N values and would like to let the user Alice
choose any one of them in such a way so that she does not
learn more than one value and Bob remains oblivious to
the value Alice chooses. Private query protocols also offer
similar functionality like 1 out of N OT protocol. Exten-
sive efforts have been given for analysing the security of
OT protocols in classical domain [31, 32]. In quantum
domain, Salvail et al. [33] provided lower bounds on the
amount of information leakage to a dishonest party in any
OT protocol. Jain et al. [34] discussed about the tradeoff
between the number of bits of information each player
gets about the other parties’ input in 1-out-of-N OT.
Those protocols provide information theoretic security.
Chailloux et al. [35] derived non trivial lower bound for
the cheating probabilities in OT exploiting lower bound
for quantum bit commitment. However, all those proto-
cols assume certain characterization of the devices and
hence do not guarantee device independent security.
C. Our Contribution
In the current report, we address the problem of per-
forming private search on a classical database such that
3the user can retrieve an item from the database with-
out revealing which item was retrieved and at the same
time, the data privacy of the database is also preserved
i.e., the user can not learn any extra information about
the database other than the query. As, it is a distrustful
cryptographic protocol, the data privacy and user secu-
rity contradicts each other. In this scheme, we try to
maintain data privacy as well as user security so that no
significant information is leaked to any of the parties and
if anyone tries to violate the security then this party will
be caught by the other party. Our main contribution in
this paper is threefold which we enumerate below:
1. Removing trustworthiness from the devices (source
as well as measurement devices) by robust CHSH
testing. Maitra et al. [25] proposed device inde-
pendent QPQ scheme using a tilted version of the
actual CHSH game. However, the tilted version
of CHSH game might not guarantee the device in-
dependence in its truest sense with non-maximally
entangled states. In this proposal, we remove the
tilted CHSH test (as in [25]) and use the traditional
CHSH game for self testing the EPR pairs.
2. We replace the usual projective measurement at
Alice’s side with optimal POVM measurement so
that Alice can obtain maximum conclusive raw key
bits. In this paper, we also show that our pro-
posed scheme provides maximum number of con-
clusive raw key bits for Alice.
3. Contrary to all the existing QPQ protocols, in the
present effort, we provide a general security anal-
ysis and provide an upper bound on the cheating
probabilities and a lower bound on the amount of
information leakage in terms of entropy for both
the parties (server as well as the client).
D. Notations and Definitions
Let us first list a few notations.
• Ik: the Identity matrix of dimension k.
• A(A∗): honest (dishonest) client Alice.
• B(B∗): honest (dishonest) server Bob.
• Ai(A∗i ): the i-th subsystem corresponding to hon-
est (dishonest) Alice.
• Bi(B∗i ): the i-th subsystem corresponding to honest
(dishonest) Bob.
• |φ〉BiAi : the i-th copy of the shared state where
1st qubit corresponds to Bob and 2nd qubit corre-
sponds to Alice.
• ρAi : the reduced density matrix at Alice’s side for
i-th shared state.
• X: the N -bit database which corresponds to server
Bob.
• R(RA): the raw key corresponding to Bob (Alice)
of size kN bits for some integer k > 1.
• F (FA): the final key corresponding to Bob (Alice)
of size N bits.
• Il: the index set of the elements which are quarried
by the client Alice.
• ai: the classical bit announced by Bob for i-th
shared state.
• A(B): measurement outcome at Alice’s (Bob’s)
side.
Next we present a few definitions that will be required
for further discussions.
• Trace Distance: The trace distance allows us to
compare two probability distributions {pi} and {qi}
over the same index set which can be defined as
Dist(pi, qi) =
1
2
∑
i
|pi − qi|.
• In quantum paradigm, the trace distance is a mea-
sure of closeness of two quantum states ρ and σ.
The trace norm of an operator M is defined as,
||M ||1 = Tr|M |,
where |M | =
√
M†M . The trace distance between
quantum states ρ and σ is given by,
Dist(ρ, σ) = Tr|ρ− σ|
= ||ρ− σ||1,
where |A| =
√
A†A is the positive square root of√
A†A.
• Fidelity: Like trace distance, fidelity is an alterna-
tive measure of closeness. In terms of fidelity, the
similarity between the two probability distributions
{pi} and {qi} can be defined as,
F (pi, qi) = (
∑
i
√
piqi)
2.
• The fidelity of two quantum states ρ and σ is de-
fined as
F (ρ, σ) = [Tr(
√
ρ1/2σρ1/2)]2.
• In case of pure states, the fidelity is a squared over-
lap of the states |ψ〉 and |φ〉, i.e.,
F (ρ, σ) = |〈ψ|φ〉|2,
where ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| and σ = |φ〉〈φ| are corresponding
density matrix representation of the pure states |ψ〉
and |φ〉 respectively.
4• The two measures of closeness of quantum states,
trace distance and fidelity, are related by the fol-
lowing inequality [37],
1−
√
F (ρ, σ) ≤ 1
2
Tr|ρ− σ| ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ).
• Trace distance has a relation with the distinguisha-
bility of two quantum states. Suppose, one referee
prepares two quantum states ρ and σ for another
party (say Alice) to distinguish. The referee pre-
pares each of the states with probability 12 . Let
pcorrect denotes the optimal guessing probability for
Alice and it is related to trace distance by the fol-
lowing expression,
pcorrect =
1
2
(1 +
1
2
Tr|ρ− σ|).
It implies that trace distance is linearly dependent
to the maximum success probability in distinguish-
ing two quantum states ρ and σ. For further details
one may refer to [37].
• Conditional Minimum Entropy: Let ρ = ρAB
be the density matrix representation of a bipartite
quantum state. Then the conditional minimum en-
tropy of subsystem A conditioned on subsystem B
is defined by ([38])
Hmin(A|B)ρ = − inf
σB
D∞(ρAB ||IA ⊗ σB),
where IA denotes the identity matrix of the dimen-
sion of system A and the infimum ranges over all
normalized density operators σB on subsystem B
and also for any two density operators T, T ′ we de-
fine,
D∞(T ||T ′) = inf{λ ∈ R : T ≤ 2λT ′}.
• Let ρXB be a bipartite quantum state where the X
subsystem is classical. For the given state ρXB if
pguess(X|B)ρXB denotes the maximum probability
of guessing X given the subsystem B, then from
[38] we have,
pguess(X|B)ρXB = 2−Hmin(X|B)ρ . (1)
In quantum private query none of the parties trust each
other. So, each of the parties have different security goals.
The security requirement of the server (Bob) is termed as
Data Privacy and the security requirement for the client
(Alice) is termed as User privacy. Formally these terms
are defined below.
Definition 1. Data Privacy: The amount of informa-
tion dishonest Alice (A∗) gets about the N -bit database
X is limited by λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1), which is negligible in N ,
i.e.,
Hmin(X|A∗) ≥ λN. (2)
Definition 2. User Privacy: Let the honest user or Al-
ice wants to have access to xi1 , . . . , xil bits of the N -bit
database X. Let Il = {i1, . . . , il} denotes the correspond-
ing indices set. Then the maximum information extracted
by a dishonest Bob (B∗) about the set Il is limited by δ
(0 ≤ δ ≤ 1), which is negligible in l, i.e.,
Hmin(Il|B∗) ≥ δl. (3)
II. PROPOSAL FOR AN IMPROVED AND
FORMAL DI-QPQ
The quantum private query protocols are composed of
several phases. Depending on the functionality, we have
divided the entire protocol into four phases. The first
phase is termed as “entanglement distribution phase”. In
this phase a third party (need not to be a trusted one and
may collude with the dishonest party) distributes several
copies of EPR-pairs between the server (Bob) and the
client (Alice). The next phase is called “entanglement
verification phase”. In this phase the server and the client
play CHSH game. If their success probability of winning
the game lies within a predefined threshold, then they
can conclude that the states, distributed by the third
party, are EPR pairs. Third phase is termed as “key
establishment phase”. In this phase the server generates
a secret key and shares some portion of it with the client.
In the last phase, i.e., in “private query phase”, server
encrypts the database using the key generated in the last
phase and send it to the client. Client then decrypts some
portion of the database using the information about the
key she received in the previous phase. Now we describe
the step by step procedures of the protocol.
• Entanglement Distribution Phase:
1. A third party distributes K copies of two qubit
entangled states between Alice and Bob which
are supposed to be of the form
|φ〉BA = 1√
2
|00〉BA + 1√
2
|11〉BA
Here Alice (Bob) receives A (B) subsystem of
|φ〉BA.
• Entanglement Verification Phase: Entangle-
ment verification phase is sub-divided into two
parts; one for Alice and one for Bob. Below we
describe the phases one by one.
1. Entanglement Verification Phase for Al-
ice:
(a) Alice randomly chooses γK2 copies of
|φ〉BA and make a set ΓACHSH with those
singlets.
(b) Alice sends information about those sin-
glets to Bob.
5(c) Alice generates γK2 random bits
u1, . . . , u γK
2
and v1, . . . , v γK
2
indepen-
dently.
(d) Alice sends v1, . . . , v γK
2
to Bob.
(e) Alice and Bob perform
CHSHtest(γK2 , ui, vi, bi, ci) for this
chosen γK2 samples.
2. Entanglement Verification Phase for
Bob:
(a) Bob randomly chooses γK2 copies of |φ〉BA
and make a set ΓBCHSH with those singlets.
(b) Bob sends information about those chosen
singlets to Alice.
(c) Bob generates γK2 random bits
u˜1, . . . , u˜ γK
2
and v˜1, . . . , v˜ γK
2
indepen-
dently.
(d) Bob sends u˜1, . . . , u˜ γK
2
to Alice.
(e) Alice and Bob perform
CHSHtest(γK2 , u˜i, v˜i, bi, ci) for this
chosen γK2 samples.
• Key Establishment Phase:
1. After the entanglement verification phase, Al-
ice and Bob share rest (1 − γ)K EPR pairs
among themselves. Let us denote that set as
ΓKey
2. Bob randomly chooses (1 − γ)K bits,
R1, . . . , R(1−γ)K.
3. For 1 ≤ i ≤ (1− γ)K Bob does the following,
– If Ri = 0, Bob measures the B-subsystem
of the i-th copy of |φ〉BA in {|0〉, |1〉} basis.
– Otherwise Bob measures the B-subsystem
of the i-th copy of |φ〉BA in {|0′〉, |1′〉} ba-
sis, where |0′〉 = cos θ|0〉+ sin θ|1〉, |1′〉 =
sin θ|0〉 − cos θ|1〉.
4. After the measurement, Bob does the follow-
ing:
For 1 ≤ i ≤ (1− γ)K,
(a) Bob declares ai = 0, if his measurement
outcome for i-th qubit is either |0〉 or |0′〉.
(b) Bob declares ai = 1, if his measurement
outcome for i-th qubit is either |1〉 or |1′〉.
5. After the declaration of the classical bit ai,
Alice does the following:
(a) Whenever Bob declares ai = 0, Alice
chooses the POVM {D0, D1, D2} for the
measurement where,
D0 ≡ (sin θ |0〉 − cos θ |1〉)(sin θ 〈0| − cos θ 〈1|)
1 + cos θ
D1 ≡ 1
1 + cos θ
|1〉 〈1|
D2 ≡ I −D0 −D1
CHSHtest(n, ui, vi)
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Alice and Bob does the following-
– If vi(v˜i) = 0, Bob performs a measurement in {|0〉, |1〉}
basis on his i-th qubit. If the measurement outcome is
|0〉 Bob outputs bi = 0, otherwise he outputs bi = 1.
– If vi(v˜i) = 1, Bob performs a measurement in
{|+〉, |−〉} basis. If the measurement outcome is |+〉
Bob outputs bi = 0, otherwise he outputs bi = 1.
– If ui(u˜i) = 0, Alice performs a measurement in
{cos pi
8
|0〉+ sin pi
8
|1〉,− sin pi
8
|0〉+ cos pi
8
|1〉} basis. If the
measurement outcome
is cos pi
8
|0〉+ sin pi
8
|1〉 Alice outputs ci = 0, otherwise
she outputs ci = 1.
– If ui(u˜i) = 1, Alice performs a measurement in
{cos pi
8
|0〉 − sin pi
8
|1〉, sin pi
8
|0〉+ cos pi
8
|1〉} basis. If the
measurement outcome is cos pi
8
|0〉 − sin pi
8
|1〉 Alice
outputs ci = 0, otherwise she outputs ci = 1.
– Bob and Alice announce their input output pairs
publicly (Whenever Alice behaves as a referee, Bob
first declares his input output pairs and then Alice
declares her input output pairs. Whenever Bob
behaves as a referee, they declare in the opposite order
i.e., Alice first declares her input output pairs and then
Bob declares his input output pairs). Based on the
values of ui(u˜i), vi(v˜i), bi, ci, Alice and Bob computes
Zi in the following manner.
Zi = 1 If ui ⊕ vi = bici(resp.u˜i ⊕ v˜i = bici)
= 0 Otherwise.
– Alice and Bob computes Z = 1
n
∑n
i=1 Zi.
– If Z < (cos2 pi
8
− η) for some predefined noise tolerance
η, Alice and Bob abort the protocol, otherwise they
continue.
After the measurement, if Alice obtains
D0(D1) then she concludes that Bob mea-
sures in {|0〉 , |1〉}({|0′〉 , |1′〉}) basis and
the original raw key bit is 0(1). Whenever
Alice gets D2, her measurement outcome
remains inconclusive.
(b) Whenever Bob declares ai = 1, Alice
chooses the POVM {D′0, D′1, D′2} for the
measurement where,
D′0 ≡
(cos θ |0〉+ sin θ |1〉)(cos θ 〈0|+ sin θ 〈1|)
1 + cos θ
D′1 ≡
1
1 + cos θ
|0〉 〈0|
D′2 ≡ I −D′0 −D′1
Similarly, in this case also, if Alice gets
D′0(D
′
1) then she concludes that Bob mea-
sures in {|0〉 , |1〉}({|0′〉 , |1′〉}) basis and
the original raw key bit is 0(1). Whenever
Alice gets D′2, her measurement outcome
remains inconclusive.
6• DI Testing for POVM Elements:
1. From this shared (1−γ)K states, Alice chooses
randomly γK2 states and sends the information
about these chosen singlets to Bob.
– Bob announces the values of those qubits.
Alice then checks whether she gets ex-
pected results for these states (i.e., if Bob
announces |0〉, the expected outcomes at
the end of Alice should be either D0 or
D2 but not D1 and so on).
– If for any of these γK2 states, Alice gets
conflicting results (i.e., Bob gets |0〉 but
Alice gets D1 and so on), Alice aborts the
protocol. Otherwise she proceeds for fur-
ther.
2. From the rest shared states, Alice again
chooses randomly γK2 states and sends the in-
formation about these chosen singlets to Bob.
– For these chosen states, Alice computes
the number of positions for which she gets
conclusive outcomes and let this number
be P .
– If P < (1−cos θ−η)γK2 for the predefined
noise tolerance η, Alice aborts the proto-
col otherwise she proceeds for further.
3. After these testing phases, Alice and Bob con-
tinue private query phase with the remaining
(1 − 2γ)K states. Note that (1 − 2γ)K = kN
for some positive integer k > 1 where N is the
number of bits in the database.
4. Alice and Bob use the raw key bits obtained
from these kN many states for next phase.
• Private Query Phase:
1. Alice and Bob now share the raw key string of
length kN where Bob knows every bit value
and Alice knows partially.
2. Bob randomly announces a permutation
which reorder the kN bit string and then Al-
ice announces a shift s0 randomly chosen from
{0, 1, · · · , kN − 1}. After the announcement,
they both shift the shared raw key by s0 and
then apply the permutation.
3. Bob cuts the raw key into N substrings of
length k and tells each bit position to Alice.
The bits of every substring are added bitwise
by Alice and Bob to form the final key of
length N . At the end, if Alice does not know
any bit of the final key F (which actually cor-
responds to Bob), then the protocol has to be
executed again.
4. Alice and Bob performs error correction on
Alice’s final key using the method proposed
in [23]. After that Alice estimates the error
rate of every final key. If all the error rates
are less than some predefined threshold value
, they proceed further to the next step. Oth-
erwise, they abort the protocol.
5. Suppose that Alice knows the i-th bit Fi of
Bob’s final key F and wants to know the j-
th bit mj of the database, then she announces
the number s = i−j. Consequently Bob shifts
the final key F by s bits and use it to encrypt
the database using one time pad. As, mj will
be encrypted by Fi, Alice can correctly recover
the intended bit after receiving the encrypted
database.
6. If Alice wants to know the information about
l database bits, she has to repeat the whole
procedure for l many times to retrieve the in-
tended bits.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL
In this section we discuss the security related issues of
our proposed protocol.
A. Correctness of the Protocol
First we prove the correctness of the protocol.
Theorem 1. For honest Alice and honest Bob scenario,
at the end of key establishment phase Alice could cor-
rectly guess only (1− cos θ)kN fraction of the entire raw
key R.
Proof. After the key establishment phase and the DI test-
ing phase for POVM elements, Bob and Alice share kN
raw key bits. These raw key bits were generated from
kN copies of maximally entangled states of the form
1√
2
(|0〉B |0〉A + |1〉B |1〉A)
=
1√
2
(|0′〉B |0′〉A + |1′〉B |1′〉A),
where, |0′〉 = cos θ |0〉 + sin θ |1〉 and |1′〉 = sin θ |0〉 −
cos θ |1〉. Here θ may vary from 0 to pi2 .
The generation of such kN raw key bits can be rede-
fined as follows.
Bob prepares a random bit stream R = R1 . . . RkN
of length kN . If Ri = 0, Bob measures his qubits in
{|0〉 , |1〉} basis. Whereas, if Ri = 1, Bob measures his
particle in {|0′〉 , |1′〉} basis. After each measurement Bob
announces a bit ai ∈ {0, 1}. If he gets |0〉 or |0′〉, he
announces ai = 0. If he gets |1〉 or |1′〉, he announces
ai = 1. Now, Alice’s job is to guess the value of each Ri.
Thus, whenever Bob declares ai = 0, Alice can un-
derstand that Bob gets either |0〉 or |0′〉 and the shared
qubit of her side also collapses to |0〉 or |0′〉 respectively.
7However, to obtain the value of the raw key bit, Alice
has to distinguish these two states conclusively. As, |0〉
and |0′〉 are non-orthogonal states (when θ 6= pi2 ), Alice
cannot distinguish these two states with certainty.
According to the strategy mentioned in the protocol,
whenever Bob declares ai = 0, Alice chooses the POVM
{D0, D1, D2}. After measurement, if Alice receives the
outcome D0, she concludes that Bob’s measurement out-
come was |0〉. In such case, Alice concludes that Ri = 0.
If Alice receives the outcome D1, she concludes that
Bob’s measurement outcome was |0′〉. In such a case, Al-
ice concludes that Ri = 1. However, if the measurement
outcome is D2, then Alice remains inconclusive about
the value of the raw key bit. Alice follows the similar
methodology for ai = 1.
Now, we calculate the success probability of Alice to
guess R correctly. Let us assume that Pr(Dj | |φi〉) de-
notes the corresponding success probability of getting the
result Dj when the given state is |φi〉 i.e.,
Pr(Dj | |φi〉) = 〈φi|Dj |φi〉 .
We will now calculate the corresponding success proba-
bilities of getting different results for the states |0〉 and
|0′〉.
For |0〉, the success probabilities will be
Pr(D0| |0〉) = 〈0|D0 |0〉
= (1− cos θ)
Pr(D1| |0〉) = 〈0|D1 |0〉
= 0
Pr(D2| |0〉) = 〈0|D2 |0〉
= cos θ
Similarly, for the state |0′〉, the success probabilities will
be
Pr(D0| |0′〉) = 〈0′|D0 |0′〉
= 0
Pr(D1| |0′〉) = 〈0′|D1 |0′〉
= (1− cos θ)
Pr(D2| |0′〉) = 〈0′|D2 |0′〉
= cos θ
Similarly, whenever Bob declares ai = 1, Alice chooses
the POVM {D′0, D′1, D′2}. In a similar way, we can cal-
culate the success probability here. We formalize all the
conditional probabilities in the following table.
Cond. Probability of Alice
a
Bob
Alice
A=D0/D
′
0 A=D1/D
′
1 A=D2/D
′
2
0 B = |0〉 1− cos θ 0 cos θ
0 B = |0′〉 0 1− cos θ cos θ
1 B = |1〉 1− cos θ 0 cos θ
1 B = |1′〉 0 1− cos θ cos θ
According to the protocol, if ai = 0 and Alice gets
D0(D1), she outputs RAi = 0(1). When ai = 1 and she
gets D′0(D
′
1), she outputs RAi = 0(1). Thus, the success
probability of Alice to guess the i-th raw key bit Ri of
Bob can be written as
Pr(RAi = Ri)
= Pr(RAi = 0, Ri = 0) + Pr(RAi = 1, Ri = 1)
= (1− cos θ).
So, the overall success probability of guessing the key
bits by Alice according to the proposed key generation
protocol becomes (1−cos θ). This implies that at the end
of key establishment phase Alice could conclusively guess
(1− cos θ)kN number of key bits on an average.
We now prove the security of our proposed protocol
considering the noise parameter η → 0.
B. Security of private query phase
In the key establishment phase, Bob chooses kN many
raw key bits randomly and Alice can know some of this
raw key bits. Then in private query phase , both Alice
and Bob cut their raw keys in some particular positions
to prepare N substrings of length k and then perform
bitwise XOR among the bits of each substring to get the
N bit final key F . Here, Ri(1 ≤ i ≤ kN) denotes the i-th
raw key of Bob and Fi(1 ≤ i ≤ N) denotes the i-th final
key of Bob. Relation between Ri and Fi can be written
as,
Fi = ⊕ikj=(i−1)k+1Rj (1 ≤ i ≤ N)
Where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2.
It will be more clearer by a toy example. Consider
N = 10 and k = 2. Let us assume that the raw key at
Bob’s side is,
01 10 01 00 10 01 01 11 00 11
and after the key establishment phase, the raw key at
Alice’s side is,
?1 ?? 0? ?? ?? 01 ?1 ?? 0? ?1
i.e., Alice knows the values of 2nd, 5th, 11th, 12th, 14th,
17th and 20th key bits of the original raw key (? stands
for inconclusive key bit).
Now, after the modulo operation on the raw key, the
final key at Bob’s side will be,
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
and the final key at Alice’s side will be,
? ? ? ? ? 1 ? ? ? ?
Thus, the number of known key bits by Alice is reduced
from 7 to 1. The significance of such modulo operation
is to enhance the security of the protocol. This is similar
to the privacy amplification in a QKD protocol.
8C. Database security against dishonest Alice
In this section we give upper bound on the amount
of raw key bits dishonest Alice can guess during the key
establishment phase.
Theorem 2. In the key establishment phase , dishonest
Alice can inconclusively retrieve at most
(
1
2 +
1
2 sin θ
)
kN
many bits of the raw key where kN is the size of the entire
raw key.
Proof. After the testing phase of key establishment, dis-
honest Alice (A∗) and honest Bob (B) share kN raw key
bits generated from the kN copies of EPR pairs. The i-
th copy of the state is given by |φ+〉BiA∗i = 1√2 |00〉BiA∗i +
1√
2
|11〉BiA∗i , where i-th subsystem of Alice and Bob is
denoted by A∗i and Bi respectively. At Alice’s side the
reduced density matrix is of the form
ρA∗i = TrBi
[|φ+〉BiA∗i 〈φ|] = I22 .
At Step 3, Bob measures each of his part of the state
|φ+〉BiA∗i in either {|0〉, |1〉} basis or in {|0′〉, |1′〉} basis.
The choice of the basis is completely random. Let ρA∗i |Ri
denotes the state at Alice’s side after the choice of Bob’s
measurement. For Ri = 0, we have ρA∗i |Ri=0 =
I2
2 = ρA∗i .
For Ri = 1 we have,
ρA∗i |Ri=1 = TrBi [φ
+〉BiA∗i 〈φ|]
= TrBi [
1
2
(|0′0′〉+ |1′1′〉)BiA∗i (〈0′0′|+ 〈1′1′|)]
=
I2
2
.
This implies ρA∗i |Ri = ρA∗i . As there is no communi-
cation between Alice and Bob before Step 4 of the key
establishment phase so, due to non-signalling principle
we can claim that Alice can guess Bob’s measurement
outcome with probability at most 12 .
At Step 4 of the key establishment phase, Alice receives
the information ai from Bob. Let ρA∗i |ai denotes the state
of Alice given the value of ai. According to the protocol,
ρA∗i |ai=0 =
1
2
|0〉〈0|+ 1
2
|0′〉〈0′|
ρA∗i |ai=1 =
1
2
|1〉〈1|+ 1
2
|1′〉〈1′|.
This implies that for a fixed ai = 0 (ai = 1) if
Alice wants to guess the value of Ri then she needs
to distinguish the state from the ensemble of states
{( 12 |0〉〈0|), ( 12 |0′〉〈0′|)} ({( 12 |1〉〈1|), ( 12 |1′〉〈1′|)}). In other
words, whenever Bob measures his qubit and announces
the bit ai = 0, Alice knows that Bob gets either |0〉 or
|0′〉. Similarly, when Bob announces the bit ai = 1, Al-
ice knows that Bob gets either |1〉 or |1′〉. So, to re-
trieve the value of the original raw key bit, Alice needs
to distinguish between the states |0〉 and |0′〉 or between
the states |1〉 or |1′〉. As it is known that non orthog-
onal quantum states cannot be distinguished perfectly,
Alice cannot guess the value of each raw key bit with
certainty. This distinguishing probability has a nice re-
lationship with the trace distance between the states in
the ensemble [37]. According to this relation we have,
Pr
guess
[Ri|ρA∗i |ai=0] =
1
2
(1 +
1
2
|||0〉〈0| − |0′〉〈0′|||1)
≤ 1
2
(1 +
√
1− F (|0〉〈0|, |0′〉〈0′|))
=
1
2
(1 + sin θ) =
1
2
+
1
2
sin θ.
One can check that Prguess[Ri|ρA∗i |ai=0] =
Prguess[Ri|ρA∗i |ai=1]. This implies that Alice can
successfully retrieve the value of Ri with probability
at most 12 +
1
2 sin θ. Now there are total kN many
bits in the raw key. So, the maximum number of bits
Alice can know inconclusively will be almost equals to(
1
2 +
1
2 sin θ
)
kN .
Lemma 1. In the key establishment phase, if Bob gen-
erates kN random bits of the raw key R and chooses k
number of raw key bits to generate every bit of the final
key F which encrypts the database X then Hmin(X|A∗) ≥
Nk log( 21+sin θ ).
Proof. From Theorem 2 we have, in the key establish-
ment phase, Prguess[Ri|A∗i ] ≤ 12 + sin θ2 , where A∗i de-
notes Alice’s subsystem corresponding to i-th EPR pair.
As, each bit of the final key F is generated by XOR-
ing k number of raw key bits, the guessing probabil-
ity of dishonest Alice for each of the final key bit Fi
will be upper bounded by the value ( 12 +
sin θ
2 )
k i.e.,
Prguess[Fi|A∗i ] ≤ ( 12 + sin θ2 )k. From the operational inter-
pretation of min-entropy [38], we can rewrite the guessing
probability as Prguess[Fi|A∗i ] = 2
−Hmin(Fi|A∗i )ρA∗
i
|ai . This
implies, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the conditional min-entropy of
the final bit Fi is Hmin(Fi|A∗i )ρA∗
i
|ai
≥ (− log( 12 + sin θ2 )k).
As, all the raw key bits Ri are chosen both randomly and
independently, each of the final key bits will also be ran-
dom. So, from the additive property of the conditional
min-entropy we have,
Hmin(F |A∗)ρA∗|a =
N∑
i=1
Hmin(Fi|A∗i )ρAi|ai
≥ −N log
(
1
2
+
sin θ
2
)k
= kN log
(
2
1 + sin θ
)
.
According to the protocol, the size of the final key is
equal to the size of the database and the database is
encrypted by performing bitwise XOR with the final key.
9So, the correct guessing of a final key bit implies the
correct guessing of the corresponding database bit. It
implies,
Hmin(X|A∗) = Nk log
(
2
1 + sin θ
)
.
For the proposed QPQ protocol, according to the def-
inition 1, the database contains N number of data bits.
From Lemma 1 we can derive the following upper bound
on the value of λ.
Corollary 1. In the proposed QPQ protocol, for dishon-
est Alice and honest Bob, Alice can guess λ fraction of
the key bits, where
λ ≤ k log
(
2
1 + sin θ
)
. (4)
In theorem 2 we show that Alice can guess only(
1
2 +
sin θ
2
)
kN fraction of the key bits. However, one can
get tighter upper bound if we restrict Alice’s guessing
strategy to only conclusive ones. In theorem 3 we give
an upper bound on how many key bits a dishonest Alice
can guess conclusively.
Theorem 3. In the key establishment phase of the pro-
tocol, for honest Bob and dishonest Alice, Alice can con-
clusively retrieve at most (1− cos θ) kN many bits of the
original raw key where kN is the size of the entire raw
key.
Proof. From the previous discussion, it is clear that the
dishonest Alice tries to distinguish either between |0〉 and
|0′〉 or between |1〉 and |1′〉 with as much confidence as
possible. For this purpose Alice will go for unambigu-
ous state discrimination for two density matrices. For
ai = 0, Alice will choose such a USD which distinguish
ρ = |0〉 〈0| or ρ′ = |0′〉 〈0′| with optimal confidence. Simi-
larly, for ai = 1, Alice will choose an optimal USD which
can distinguish ρ = |1〉 〈1| or ρ′ = |1′〉 〈1′| with max-
imum confidence. In this regard, she chooses optimal
POVM {D0, D1, D2} when Bob announces ai = 0 and
{D′0, D′1, D′2} when Bob announces ai = 1 (Please see
the Appendix for the derivation of optimal POVM ele-
ments).
If the outcome is D0, Alice concludes that the state
was |0〉. If it is D1, the state was |0′〉. The guessing will
be inconclusive only when the measurement outcome will
be D2.
Similarly, whenever the outcome is D′0, Alice conclu-
sively knows that the state was |1〉. If it is D′1, Alice
concludes that the state was |1′〉. She can not tell any-
thing if the measurement outcome will be D′2.
From Theorem 1, we get that the success probability
of Alice to guess a key bit conclusively is 1−cos θ. There
are total kN bits in the raw key. Hence, the total number
of raw key bits that Alice can conclusively guess will be
(1− cos θ)kN .
The comparative study between maximum inconclu-
sive success probability and maximum conclusive success
probability is shown in figure 1. From the figure, it is
clear that the maximum inconclusive success probability
outperforms maximum conclusive success probability for
small values of θ.
FIG. 1: Comparison between maximum inconclusive and con-
clusive success probability of the client
D. User security against dishonest Bob
Theorem 4. In the proposed QPQ protocol, for each
index i, a dishonest Bob (B∗) can successfully guess
whether i ∈ Il with probability at most (1− cos θ)k, i.e,
Pr
guess
[i ∈ Il]ρB∗
i
≤ (1− cos θ)k
where, k is the number of raw key bits used to generate a
final key bit.
Proof. At the key establishment phase, dishonest Bob
(B∗) and honest Alice (A) share kN raw key bits gener-
ated from kN copies of EPR pairs. The i-th copy of the
state is given by |φ+〉B∗iAi = 1√2 |00〉B∗iAi + 1√2 |11〉B∗iAi =
1√
2
|0′0′〉B∗iAi+ 1√2 |1′1′〉B∗iAi , where i-th subsystem of Bob
and Alice is denoted by B∗i and Ai respectively. At Al-
ice’s side the reduced density matrix is of the form
ρAi = TrBi
[|φ+〉B∗iA〈φ+|] = I22 .
At step 4 of key establishment phase, Alice receives
the information of ai from Bob. In the next step, Alice
performs a particular POVM measurement. Then, based
on the post measurement state and the value of ai, Alice
concludes the value of her raw key bit.
Let RAi denotes the bit that Alice concludes after ob-
serving ai. Then we can write,
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Pr[RAi = 0|ai = 0] = 〈0|D0|0〉
Pr[RAi = 1|ai = 0] = 〈0′|D1|0′〉
Pr[RAi = 0|ai = 1] = 〈1|D′0|1〉
Pr[RAi = 1|ai = 1] = 〈1′|D′1|1′〉
.
Let for any dishonest Bob B∗, Pr[ai = 0] = p and
Pr[ai = 1] = 1− p. This implies,
Pr[RAi 6=⊥] = p[〈0|D0|0〉+ 〈0′|D1|0′〉]
+ (1− p)[〈1|D′0|1〉+ 〈1′|D′1|1′〉].
Let for all index i, Alice can get conclusive outcome
with probability atmost q i.e.,
Pr[RAi 6=⊥] ≤ q.
So, Alice can successfully guess each bit of the raw
key with probability atmost q. As, each of the final key
bit is generated from this raw key by performing bitwise
XOR operation among k raw key bits, Alice’s success
probability of getting each of the final key bit is upper
bounded by qk.
If FAi denotes the i-th bit of the final key that Alice
gets after the XOR operation, then we can write,
Pr[FAi 6=⊥] ≤ qk.
Let Prguess[FAi 6=⊥]ρB∗
i
denotes dishonest Bob’s guess-
ing probability of FAi 6=⊥. As Alice gets atmost Nqk po-
sitions of the actual final key F conclusively and in the
key establishment phase, there is no communication from
Alice’s side, so dishonest Bob can guess whether FAi 6=⊥
or not with probability atmost qk, i.e,
Pr
guess
[FAi 6=⊥]ρB∗
i
≤ qk. (5)
Now, Alice can retrieve a database bit correctly when
Alice gets a conclusive key bit. Let Alice gets ith key bit
of the final key F after all the post processing of raw key
bits. In this case, Alice can retrieve ith element of the
database, i.e., i ∈ Il. This can be written as,
Pr[i ∈ Il|FAi 6=⊥] = 1. (6)
Let Prguess[i ∈ I|FAi 6=⊥]ρB∗
i
denotes dishonest Bob’s
guessing probability of i ∈ Il. Now, if Bob knows that
Alice gets conclusive result for her i-th key bit then Bob
can guess Alice’s corresponding query index with cer-
tainty because the shift amount is known publicly. This
implies,
Pr
guess
[i ∈ Il|FAi 6=⊥]ρB∗
i
= 1
Pr
guess
[i ∈ Il, FAi 6=⊥]ρB∗
i
= 1. Pr
guess
[FAi 6=⊥]ρB∗
i
From equation 5 we have Prguess[FAi 6=⊥]ρB∗
i
≤ qk.
This implies,
Pr
guess
[i ∈ Il]ρB∗
i
≤ qk
From theorem 3 we have q ≤ (1− cos θ). This completes
the proof.
Lemma 2. In the private query phase, if Alice wants
to know l number of database bits and if Il denotes
the corresponding query index set then Hmin(Il|B∗) ≥
lk log( 11−cos θ ) where dishonest Bob’s subsystem is de-
noted by B∗.
Proof. In the key establishment phase, if honest Alice can
guess each of the raw key bit with probability atmost
(1− cos θ) and uses k number of raw key bits to generate
a final key bit FAi then it is clear that
Pr[FAi 6=⊥] ≤ (1− cos θ)k.
From theorem 4, we can see that if i denotes an index
of the database then
Pr
guess
[i ∈ Il|B∗] ≤ (1− cos θ)k.
where B∗ denotes dishonest Bob’s subsystem correspond-
ing to i-th EPR pair.
From the operational interpretation of min-entropy
[38], we can rewrite the guessing probability of dishonest
Bob as Prguess[i ∈ Il|B∗] = 2−Hmin[i∈Il|B∗]. This implies,
for all the l query indexes 1 ≤ i ≤ l, the conditional
min-entropy of a query index bit i is Hmin[i ∈ Il|B∗] ≥
(− log(1− cos θ)k).
As, all the query index bits are chosen independently,
from the additive property of the conditional min-entropy
we have,
Hmin[i ∈ Il|B∗] =
l∑
i=1
Hmin[i ∈ Il|B∗]
≥ −l log((1− cos θ)k)
= lk log
(
1
1− cos θ
)
.
For the proposed QPQ protocol, according to the def-
inition 2, Alice wants to know the value of l data bits
from the database. From Lemma 2 we can derive the
following upper bound on the value of δ.
Corollary 2. In the proposed QPQ protocol, for dishon-
est Bob and honest Alice, Bob can guess δ fraction of
Alice’s query index set, where
δ ≤ k log
(
1
1− cos θ
)
. (7)
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In order to increase Alice’s conclusiveness about the
raw key as well as the final key bits, dishonest Bob can
perform middle state attack which was proposed in the
security analysis of [14] and [16]. In the middle state
attack, instead of measuring his qubit in {|0〉 , |1〉} or
{|0′〉 , |1′〉} basis, dishonest Bob will measure his qubit in
a middle state basis {|0′′〉 , |1′′〉} irrespective of the value
of raw key bits where,
|0′′〉 = cos θ
2
|0〉+ sin θ
2
|1〉 ,
|1′′〉 = sin θ
2
|0〉 − cos θ
2
|1〉 .
According to this strategy, after measuring his qubit in
{|0′′〉 , |1′′〉} basis, if Bob gets |0′′〉, he will announce 1 and
0 otherwise. Whenever Bob gets |0′′〉, Alice’s qubit will
also collapse to |0′′〉 and when Bob gets |1′′〉, Alice’s qubit
will collapse to |1′′〉. When Bob announces 1 (i.e., actu-
ally he gets |0′′〉), honest Alice will choose the POVM
{D′0, D′1, D′2} for measurement and conclude about the
raw key bit based on her measurement outcome. Simi-
larly, whenever Bob announces 0 (i.e., whenever, he gets
|1′′〉), honest Alice will choose the POVM {D0, D1, D2}
for measurement and conclude about the raw key bit ac-
cording to her measurement outcome. It can be shown
that in this case, Alice will get either D0 or D1 for ai = 0
and D′0 or D
′
1 for ai = 1. Alice will not get D2 or D
′
2
in any of the cases. However, when Alice gets D0 or
D1 for ai = 0 and D
′
0 or D
′
1 for ai = 1, it will not be
known to Bob. So, half of the cases Alice’s results match
with Bob’s encoding. In this strategy, Alice will get cor-
rect result for each raw key bits with probability 12 ,i.e.,
Pr(RAi = Ri) =
1
2 . Therefore, the correctness condition
of the protocol is violated. As a result, finally, when Al-
ice tries to extract the elements from the database, she
obtains wrong elements.
In the present draft we are interested about those at-
tacks which preserve the correctness condition of the pro-
tocol. As middle state attack does not preserve correct-
ness condition, we will not consider this as a valid attack
model.
E. Device independent security
In the proposed protocol, the device independent (DI)
testing has been done in two phases. The first DI test-
ing is done in entanglement verification phase and the
second DI testing occurs at key establishment phase. In
entanglement verification phase two way CHSH game has
been performed. Firstly. Alice tests whether the entan-
gled states provided by the third party are EPR pairs by
playing CHSH game. In this part Alice does not trust
Bob and she plays the role of a referee. Alice chooses the
classical input bits randomly on behalf of referee. They
(Alice and Bob) then perform measurement according to
the random bit values at the end of each party. After the
measurement, they discuss the output publicly and check
the fraction of inputs that satisfy the CHSH condition.
From the rigidity of CHSH game [39] one can conclude
the following.
Theorem 5. In the entanglement verification phase for
Alice, if Alice and Bob wins (cos2 pi8 − η)γK2 instances,
then the shared state is O(
√
η) far from |Φ〉BA = |φ〉⊗γKBA .
Similarly, Bob tests the shared entangled states and
the associated devices by playing CHSH game with Alice.
In this part Bob does not trust Alice and he plays the
role of a referee. From the rigidity of CHSH game [39]
one can conclude the following.
Theorem 6. In the entanglement verification phase for
Bob, if Alice and Bob wins (cos2 pi8−η)γK2 instances, then
the shared state is O(
√
η) far from |Φ〉BA = |φ〉⊗γKBA .
The second DI testing is done in key establishment
phase. This testing phase basically guarantees the DI
security for the POVM devices involved in the protocol
given that the first DI testing phase is successfully passed
by both the parties. Note that, here, Bob need not to test
his measurement devices again. During CHSH testing his
devices are tested already. However, Alice has to shift
to a new measurement device for better conclusiveness.
Device independence security demands that Alice’s new
device should be tested further for certification. This sec-
ond DI testing phase is again subdivided into two steps.
In first step, Alice chooses randomly a fraction of mea-
sured states and sends the information about these cho-
sen singlets to Bob. Bob then announces the value of
qubits corresponding to each of these chosen states. Al-
ice checks whether she gets expected outcomes for all
these cases, i.e., if Bob announces |0〉, Alice should get
either D0 or D2 but not D1 and so on. If for any one of
these states, Alice gets conflicting results (i.e., Bob gets
|0〉 but Alice gets D1 and so on), she concludes something
wrong in her devices.
Conditioning on the event that the first step has been
successfully passed, Alice goes for second testing. In
this case, Alice again chooses randomly some fraction
of states from the remaining states and sends the infor-
mation about those chosen singlets to Bob. Bob declares
the value of each qubit for these states. Alice computes
the number of positions for which she gets conclusive out-
comes. Let this number be P . If P < (1 − cos θ − η)γK2
for the predefined noise tolerance η, then Alice concludes
that her measurement device is not perfect.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Most of the quantum private query protocols have been
proposed considering quantum key distribution. Thus, a
significant portion of the security issues depend on the
security of the underlying QKD protocol. For example,
to achieve a secure QPQ protocol the legitimate parties
should possess every detail of the devices used. To re-
move such an assumption, like a DI-QKD scheme, we
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have to test the devices first. In this direction Maitra
et al [25] proposed tilted version of CHSH test over the
QPQ protocol designed by Yang et al [20]. The authors
chose tilted version of CHSH game because of the usage
of non-maximally entangled states in Yang et al protocol.
In the present draft, we design a novel DI-QPQ proto-
col considering maximally entangled states. And hence,
we can exploit the standard CHSH game to certify the
devices. This improves the robustness of the protocol.
Further, all the existing QPQ protocols analyzed the se-
curity issues considering certain eavesdropping strategies.
However, in the present draft, we analyzed the security of
our proposed protocol in the most general way. We found
an upper bound in the information leakage through the
protocol both to dishonest client and to dishonest server.
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Appendix
Here, we consider the case of distinguishing |0〉 and |0′〉
with maximum confidence. We first consider a POVM
containing the three following elements,
D0 ≡ α(sin θ |0〉 − cos θ |1〉)
(sin θ 〈0| − cos θ 〈1|)
D1 ≡ β |1〉 〈1|
D2 ≡ I −D0 −D1.
Let this POVM provides minimum uncertainty in distin-
guishing |0〉 and |0′〉. If Pr(Dj | |φi〉) denotes the corre-
sponding success probability of getting the result Dj for
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the given state |φi〉. Then
Pr(D0| |0〉) = 〈0|D0 |0〉 = α sin2 θ
Pr(D1| |0〉) = 〈0|D1 |0〉 = 0
Pr(D2| |0〉) = 〈0|D2 |0〉 = 1− α sin2 θ
Pr(D0| |0′〉) = 〈0′|D0 |0′〉 = 0
Pr(D1| |0′〉) = 〈0′|D1 |0′〉 = β sin2 θ
Pr(D2| |0′〉) = 〈0′|D2 |0′〉 = 1− β sin2 θ
According to the choice of this POVM elements, when-
ever the outcome is D2, the result will be inconclusive
i.e., for those cases nothing can be concluded about the
given state. So, for two different states (here |0〉 and
|0′〉), the probability of getting the outcome D2 must be
the same. Otherwise, there will be a bias in the choice of
states corresponding to the inconclusive result D2. Thus,
Pr(D2| |0〉) = Pr(D2| |0′〉) which implies α = β.
Our aim is to choose the value of α which will minimize
the overall uncertainty. We get,
Pr(m = D2) = Pr(D2| |0〉).Pr(|0〉) + Pr(D2| |0′〉).Pr(|0′〉)
In this protocol, for the declaration ai = 0, these
two states occur with equal probability. So, Pr(|0〉) =
Pr(|0′〉) = 12 . This implies,
Pr(m = D2) = (1− α sin2 θ)
For a particular state, the value of θ is constant. So, to
minimize the overall uncertainty, we have to maximize
the value of α such that the POVM elements satisfy the
necessary conditions. As each POVM element should be
positive semidefinite, the eigenvalues of D0, D1, D2 must
be greater than or equals to 0. From the characteristic
equation, i.e., det(Di − λi+1I) = 0, i = {0, 1, 2}, we can
find the eigenvalues of the operators.
Let λ1, λ2 and λ3 denotes the eigenvalues of D0, D1
and D2 respectively. Solving the characteristic equation
for each POVM element, we get λ1 = 0 or α and λ2 =
0 or α and λ3 = (1−α) +α cos θ or (1−α)−α cos θ. As
λ3 must be greater than or equals to 0, we get a bound
on the value of α by setting the above expressions for
λ3 ≥ 0.
From the first relation i.e., (1 − α) + α cos θ ≥ 0, we
get α ≤ 11−cos θ . Similarly, from the second relation i.e.,
(1 − α) − α cos θ ≥ 0, we get α ≤ 11+cos θ . It is easy
to verify that α = 11−cos θ provides negative value for λ3
whenever λ3 = (1 − α) − α cos θ. So, this is not a valid
bound as the value of λ3 cannot be negative. Hence we
get
0 ≤ α ≤ 1
1 + cos θ
The minimum probability of uncertainty will be equals
to,
Pr(m = D2) = (1− α sin2 θ)
=
(
1− sin
2 θ
1 + cos θ
)
= (1− 1 + cos θ)
= cos θ
Substituting the values of α and β, one can construct
D0, D1, D2. Proceeding in the same manner one can con-
struct D′0, D
′
1, D
′
2.
